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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
CHANCE L. ROBINSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20090015-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
I. MR. ROBINSON'S CONVICTION FOR POSSESSION OR USE OF A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE MUST BE REVERSED 
The statute making the presence of a controlled substance in a person's body 
a crime the same as that person's storing or ingesting the substance violates both 
the constitution protections. 
A. "Possession or Use" by Means of Consumption Is Not a 
Continuing Offense 
In his opening brief, Mr. Robinson pointed to the appalling results that the 
statute at issue can yield because of its allowing multiple prosecutions and 
convictions to occur because of a single ingestion of a controlled substance. The 
State responded by arguing that a single ingestion could not result in more than one 
conviction under the statute because the entire time during which the controlled 
substance remained in the person's body would be a single continuing offense for 
which only one conviction could be had. For the following reasons, the State's 
response is unconvincing. 
The State's argument is confusing because the State fails to define 
adequately the terms which it uses. Specifically, the State fails to acknowledge the 
inherently ambiguous nature of the crime of which Mr. Robinson was convicted: 
"possession or use" of a controlled substance. Amended Information at Count 5 
(Record at 49-50) (emphasis added). By statute, that phrase is defined as 
"ownership, control, occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, maintaining, or the 
application, inhalation, swallowing, injection, and consumption." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-2(l)(ii). The State has previously argued before the Utah Supreme Court 
that this definition should be divided into two parts, i.e., those parts that constitute 
"possession" and those parts that constitute "use": 
The Act defines "[possession or use" as "the joint or individual 
ownership, control, occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, 
maintaining, or the application, inhalation, swallowing, injection, or 
consumption, as distinguished from distribution, of controlled 
substances and includes individual, joint, or group possession or use 
of controlled substances...." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(l)(dd) (Supp. 
1999). This definition may thus be divided into two parts - one 
defining "possession" and the other "use": 
2 
"Possession" ... means the joint or individual 
ownership, control, occupancy, holding, retaining, 
belonging, [or] maintaining ... of controlled substances 
"[U]se" means ... the application, inhalation, 
swallowing, injection, or consumption, as distinguished 
from distribution, of controlled substances .... 
Id. The question before the Court here focuses solely on the meaning 
of "consumption" as it is used to define "use." 
See State's Brief in State v. Ireland, Case No. 20050279-SC (copy of relevant 
excerpts attached as Addendum (cited portion highlighted in yellow)) at *7-*8. 
Thus, the State argued that a person's consumption of a controlled substance 
constitutes only the "use" of a controlled substance, not its possession. It is 
important to remember that "consumption" in turn is defined to include the 
presence of a controlled substance portion in a person's blood stream, which the 
State has conceded is the only theory under which it is prosecuting Mr. Robinson 
for this charge. Record at 134, p. 8, lines 3-8. Accordingly, in this case, as in the 
Ireland case, Mr. Robinson is being prosecuted only for his alleged "use" of a 
controlled substance, not his possession thereof. 
Despite the fact that it is pursuing only Mr. Robinson's alleged use of a 
controlled substance, in arguing that Mr. Robinson is guilty of a continuing 
offense, the State relies exclusively on case law addressing possession, not use, of 
controlled substances. Specifically, in opposing Mr. Robinson's argument, the 
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State argues that a person that has a controlled substance in his or her bloodstream 
and travels through multiple counties would not thereby be subject to multiple 
prosecutions because '"possession of a narcotic drugs . . . is a continuing 
[offense]5" which is subject to only one prosecution. Appellee's Brief at 12-13 
(emphasis added) (quoting State v. Jasso, 439 P.2d 844, 849 (Utah 1968) 
(Crockett, C.J., dissenting) (alterations made by the State)1). The discussion of 
"possession" by each of the authorities cited by the State is a discussion of 
possession with its traditional meaning of "ownership, control, occupancy, holding, 
retaining, belonging, [or] maintaining." See Appellee's Brief at 12-13 and cases 
cited there. 
Accordingly, there is no basis for accepting the State's argument that the 
person that smoked a marijuana joint in Logan and then traveled through ten 
different counties to St. George would not in fact be subject to at least ten separate 
prosecutions. 
1
 In its citation to Jasso, the State failed to note that it was actually citing the 
dissenting opinion, not the opinion of the court, and even within that opinion the 
comment was nothing more than dictum. Mr. Robinson is unable to locate any 
other authority from this State to support the State's proposition that "possession or 
use" as that term is used in the applicable state is a "continuing offense" that is 
subject to only one prosecution. 
2
 The State's unwillingness or inability to use a consistently-defined term shows 
that what the State is attempting to criminalize by its statutory definition of 
"possession or use", i.e., the mere presence of a controlled substance in the 
defendant's bloodstream, is truly outside the mainstream. 
A 
B. Robinson v. California, Not Powell v. Texas, Controls This Case 
The State opposes application of California v. Robinson, 370 U.S 660 
(1962), to this case. Specifically, it argues that "[ujnlike California's addiction 
law, Utah's measurable amount provision does not 'authorize criminal punishment 
for a bare desire to commit a criminal act." . . . It criminalizes the actual 
'possession or use' of narcotics." Appellee's Brief at 15 (citation omitted). In 
making this argument, the State ignores the fact that once the controlled substance 
is in a person's body, it is beyond the person's ability to control. Unlike the actual 
knowing and intentional ingestion of the drug, which is always completely under 
the control of the user, the ongoing metabolizing of the drug inside a person's body 
is not subject to that person's conscious control. 
This is precisely why the California statute was unconstitutional; an addict 
simply cannot control the fact that he has a craving for a particular drug. This is 
why criminalizing the simple consumption of controlled substances, as defined in 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(l)(c), violates the Eighth Amendment's proscription on 
cruel and unusual punishments and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process 
Clause. Indeed, this Court has already made clear its agreement with this position. 
See State v. Ireland, 2005 UT App 22 f^ 20, affd on other grounds, 2006 UT 17. 
Of course, Mr. Robinson acknowledges that the addict is able to control his 
actions in responding to that craving, which is why narcotics use statutes are not 
constitutionally objectionable under the argument he advances here. 
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The State seeks to distinguish Robinson by citing Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 
514 (1968), which upheld the enforcement of a public intoxication statute. 
Specifically, the State argues that Powell "flatly rejected the suggestions 'that 
Robinson stands for the . . . principle that criminal penalties may not be inflicted 
upon a person for being in a condition he is powerless to change.'" Appellee's 
Brief at 17 (quoting Powell, 392 U.S. at 533 (internal quotation marks and 
alterations omitted)). Powell did not reject this principle. Because the Powell 
defendant was convicted of being in a public place while intoxicated, the question 
of that principle's validity was not even before the Court. Although it was 
probably true that his intoxication was a status that he could not change once that 
defendant had ingested the intoxicant, he always had control over whether he was 
in public. Because the defendant had the ability to not enter the public or to 
remove himself from the public, he was properly held criminally liable for public 
intoxication. The same principle validates the State's prohibition on driving while 
under the influence of alcohol or drugs, which it has already enforced in this case. 
These are very different situations, however, from what this Court now 
faces. In this case, under the possession or use by consumption statute, Robison 
could not comply with the statute at all once he had ingested the controlled 
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substance.4 This is true whether such ingestion was knowing and intentional or 
not. That is the distinction between Robinson and Powell And it is the controlling 
factor in this case. 
Accordingly, this Court should follow its prior decision in Ireland and hold 
that prosecution for the mere presence of a controlled substance in one's 
bloodstream is prohibited under Robinson, 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, as well as those stated in Appellant's 
Opening Brief, the trial court's denial of Mr. Robinson's motion to quash and his 
subsequent conviction and sentence for possession or use of a controlled substance 
should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this 21st day of December, 2009. 
FILLMORE SPENCER LLC 
Matthew R. Howell 
3301 North University Avenue 
Provo,Utah 84604 
Tel. (801)426-8200 
Fax: (801)426-8208 
4
 Again, the State would have been free to prosecute Mr. Robinson for such actual 
ingestion if it had the evidence necessary to do so. The State, however, has already 
conceded that it does not have that evidence. 
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7ARGUMENT 
The trial court ruled that "consumption' includes [the] physiological metabolism of [a] substance, which [is] an 
ongoing process," and that defendant was thus subject to prosecution in Utah. R. 207. The court of appeals reversed, 
holding that "consumption" does not include the metabolism of a substance in the body, but is "a catchall term to 
encompass novel methods of introducing a substance into the body." Ireland, 2005 UT App 22, \ 19. The court of 
appeals also concluded that "a contrary holding would subject 'status criminals,' such as drug addicts, to continuous 
guilt for possession or use of a controlled substance" in violation of the Eighth Amendment Id. at \ 20. The holdings 
are incorrect. 
1. "Consumption" includes the metabolization of a controlled substance in the body. 
The Utah Controlled Substances Act prohibits both the possession of a controlled substance and the use of a 
controlled substance. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1999) (making it unlawful to "knowingly and 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Oris. US Gov. Works 
2005 WL 6109899 (Utah) Page 2 
intentionally... possess or use a controlled substance"). IFhe Act define* "[possession or use" as "the joint or 
Individual ownership, control^ occupancy, holding,' retaining, belonging, maintaining, or the application, inhalation, 
Swallowing, injection, or consumption, as distinguished from distribution, of controlled subslances and includes 
individual joint , or group possession or use of controlled substances... " *8Utah Code Ann § 58-37-2(l)(dd) (Supp 
1999), This definition may thus be divided into twoj>arts - one defining "possession" and the other "use": 
possession"..^ means the joint or individual ownership, control, occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, [or] 
maintaining... of controlled substances.,.. 
|[U]se" means... the application, inhalation, swallowing, injection, or consumption, as distinguished, ftpfff 
gJX The question before the Court here focuses soieLy on me meaning or consumption as n is usea to aefine "use?? 
This Court's "primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain 
language, in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve." State v Burns, 2000 UT 56, f 25,4 P 3d 795 The 
Court reads the statutory language so as "to render all parts [of the statute] relevant and meaningful." State v 
Maestas, 2002 UT 123, If 52,63 P.3d 621 (quoting Utah v Tooele County, 2002 UT 8, If 10,44 P.2d 680) (emphasis 
and brackets in original). Accordingly, "'effect must be given, if possible, to every word, clause and sentence of a 
statute .... No clause [,] sentence or word shall be construed as superfluous, void or insignificant if the construction 
can be found which will give force to and preserve all the words of the statute." Id at % 53 (quoting Norman J. 
Singer, 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46:06 (4th ed. 1984). 
*9 In interpreting a statute, the Court" do[es] not look to language in isolation," but "look[s] first to the statute's 
plain language, in relation to the statute as a whole, to determine its meaning."' Calhoun v State Farm Mutual Auto 
Ins Co., 2004 UT 56, f 18,96 P.3d 916. Accordingly, to determine the meaning of "consumption," the Court must 
also determine the meaning of the other terms that define "use," i.e., "application,""inhalation," "swallowing," and 
"injection." 
"Application" is the act of "plac[ing] in contact," as in "apply[ing] an antiseptic to a cut," Webster's Third New Int'l 
Dictionary 105 (1993), or as in a "suppository application," Charles L. Eberle, "On the Use of Wax, Tallow, Etc., in 
Suppositories," American Journal of Pharmacy, Vol. XLIII, 1871. "Inhalation" is the act of "draw[ing] in by 
breathing," Webster's at 1163, as in smoking, sniffing, or snorting. "Swallowing" is the act of "takfing] m through 
the mouth as food," Webster's at 717, or drink. And "injection" is "the act... of injecting a drug or other substance 
into the body." Webster's at 1164. 
The court of appeals reasoned that because the foregoing terms each describe a method by which a controlled 
substance may be introduced into the body, "consumption" should likewise be limited to a method by which a 
controlled substance is introduced into the body. See Ireland, 2005 UT App 22, f 19. The court concluded that it is 
"a catchall term to encompass novel methods of introducing a substance into the body." Id That conclusion, 
however, is not supported by reason, nor is it supported by the plain meaning of "consumption." 
*10 To introduce a drug into one's body, a person must either apply it, inhale it, swallow it, or inject it. Unless one 
can "wish" or "will" a substance into the body, there are no other ways, and will be no other ways, to introduce 
drugs into the body. The court of appeals's suggestion that "consumption" is a catchall term is thus illusory and not 
supported by reason. 
Moreover, the plain language of the statute does not suggest that "consumption" is a catchall term. As the statute 
reads now, "use" means "the application, inhalation, swallowing, injection, or consumption... of controlled 
substances." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(l)(dd). Had the legislature intended "consumption" to be a catchall term for 
introducing drugs inlo the body, it would have defined "use" as "the application, inhalation, swallowing, injection, 
or other consumption... of controlled substances." But it did not. And as such, the Legislature must have intended a 
2005 WL 6109899 (Utah) Page 3 
meaning distinct from the other terms defining use. See Maestas, 2002 UT 123, Tf 52 (holding that effect must be 
given to every word of a statute). 
Webster's defines "consumption" as "the act or action of consuming or destroying" or the "using up... of 
something." Webster's at 490. "Consume" means "to use up; expend" or "to waste or burn away." Id. As noted by 
the court of appeals, "Black's Law Dictionary defines 'consumption' as '[t]he act of destroying a thing by using it; 
the use of a thing in a way that thereby exhausts it." Ireland, 2005 UT App 22, ^ 10 (quoting Black's Law 
Dictionary 312 (7th ed. 1999) (emphases added). Therefore, by its ordinary and common definition, "consumption" 
is much more *11 than the act of introducing a substance into the body. It is the action or process of "using up" the 
substance or "burnfing] away" the substance until it is exhausted. For example, gasoline is not immediately 
consumed when it is introduced into the gas tank at the fuel pump, but is progressively consumed as the vehicle 
"uses" or "expends" the fuel. Likewise, methamphetamine is not immediately consumed upon injection or 
inhalation, but is progressively consumed as it is metabolized in the body. So long as the drug is in the bloodstream, 
the drug is not destroyed or exhausted, and the consumption continues. 
Under its common definition, "consumption" thus reasonably includes the metabolism of a controlled substance in 
the body. See Merriam-Webster Med. Diet., at www2.merriamwebster.com/cgibin/mwmednlm?book=Medi-
cal&va=meta-bolism (defining metabolism as "the processes by which a particular substance is handled (as by 
assimilation and incorporation or by detoxification and excretion) in the living body"). In fact, "consumption" is 
frequently used in this very way. See, e.g., J.D. Maltzman, Developments in the Fight Against Cancer Cachexia, 
Abramson Cancer Center of the U. of Pennsylvania, at http:/ / www.oncolink.org/resources/ 
article.cfm?c=3&s=38&ss=164&id.=828 (stating that "[o]ften, the body's consumption of energy is also increased," 
or, "[i]n other words, the body's metabolic rate, even at rest, is significantly higher"); Health Matters Library A-Z, at 
http:// www.abc.net.au/health/regions/library/ ff_diabetes.htm (stating that" [p]hysical activity increases the body's 
consumption of glucose from the blood"); Burn Rate *12 Testing Centers, at http://burnratediet.com/centers/ 
about.cfm (stating that [a] quicker way to determine your metabolic, or burn, rate, is to take a simple test which 
measures your body's consumption of energy either at rest or while exercis-ing") 
* * * 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
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